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NECESSARILY HYPOCRITICAL: THE LEGAL 
VIABILITY OF EPA’S REGULATION OF 
STATIONARY SOURCE GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
Nathan D. Riccardi* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA made clear 
that greenhouse gases fall within the realm of air pollutants the Clean Air 
Act was designed to regulate. The Court’s decision sparked a chain reac-
tion forcing the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases under different provi-
sions of the Act. The EPA’s decision to regulate drew fierce criticism, espe-
cially from industries that would be forced to reduce emissions. Oppo-
nents argue that greenhouse gases are not traditional pollutants and 
therefore the drafters of the Clean Air Act did not intend them to be regu-
lated. Furthermore, they argue that the EPA over-stepped its authority in 
“tailoring” a new rule to incorporate greenhouse gases more appropriately 
into the Act’s framework. This Note defends the EPA’s decision to regulate 
greenhouse gases, as well as its Tailoring Rule. In light of the Clean Air 
Act’s explicit language and legislative intent, the EPA was not only legally 
justified in implements its decision, but it had no other choice. 
Introduction 
 Since the landmark Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, federal regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) has become one 
of the most controversial environmental issues of the 21st century.1 Ra-
ther than inspiring unified action, this controversy has led to legislative 
indecision in an attempt to devise a solution to global warming.2 The 
United States has refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol,3 and the potential 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1 See James R. Farrell, Happy New Year? With the Advent of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Only 
Days Away, Many in Industry Might Prefer, Instead, to Turn Back the Clock, Am. C. Envtl. Law. 
(Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.acoel.org/post/2010/12/28/happy-new-year-with-the-advent-
of-greenhouse-gas-regulation-only-days-away-many-in-industry-might-prefer-instead-to-turn-
back-the-clock-.aspx. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
2 See Farrell, supra note 1. 
3 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 509. 
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for enactment of federal legislation specifically tailored to address 
GHGs has been clouded by doubt.4 
 The Clean Air Act (CAA) was not meant to address GHGs when it 
was drafted.5 In fact, climate change-related pollutants do not fit easily 
into the structure contemplated by the Act.6 The Massachusetts v. EPA 
decision, however, was the first in a series of developments that estab-
lishes the CAA as the preeminent statute in the climate change battle.7 
The Court’s decision all but mandated the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to find that GHGs “may reasonably be anticipated to en-
danger public health or welfare,” and to regulate the pollutants under 
several provisions of the Act.8 
 Despite its flexibility, the CAA, if literally applied to GHGs, threat-
ened to seize regulatory control of millions of U.S. businesses.9 The 
EPA itself noted that such application would paralyze permitting au-
thorities and render the statute unworkable.10 Thus, to avoid this disas-
ter, the EPA effectively rewrote the provision of the CAA that would 
regulate GHGs and lead to such absurd results, invoking judicial defer-
ence under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.11 
 Many commentators, industrialists, and state governments have 
taken issue not only with the Massachusetts v. EPA decision and the ap-
plicability of the CAA to GHGs, but also with the EPA’s implementation 
of the Act.12 This Note argues, however, that given the Court’s decision 
in Massachusetts v. EPA, the mandatory and interdependent triggering 
rules in the statute, and the flexible, forward-looking, and precaution-
ary nature of the CAA, the EPA was not only within its legal authority to 
enact such regulation but it was practically forced to do so.13 
                                                                                                                      
4 George F. Allen & Marlo Lewis, Finding the Proper Forum for Regulation of U.S. Green-
house Gas Emissions: The Legal and Economic Implications of Massachusetts v. EPA, 44 U. Rich. 
L. Rev. 919, 919, 933 (2010). Federal bills include the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security 
Act of 2007 and the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, 
among others. Id. at 919. 
5 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532. 
6 John Copeland Nagle, Climate Exceptionalism, 40 Envtl. L. 53, 55 (2010). “Unlike most 
air pollutants, CO2 occurs naturally in the atmosphere, is actually necessary for human life, is 
not toxic when breathed . . . and harms people and the environment indirectly by facilitating 
the greenhouse effect that has begun to change the world’s climates.” Id. 
7 See infra notes 29–49 and accompanying text. 
8 See id. 
9 See Allen & Lewis, supra note 4, at 923–24. 
10 See infra notes 126–154 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 126–168 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 169–183 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 184–254 and accompanying text. 
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 Part I of this Note outlines the basic legal framework of the CAA, 
as well as how the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA impacts that 
regulatory framework with respect to GHGs. Part II presents the poten-
tially explosive applicability of the CAA to GHGs in a post-Massachusetts 
v. EPA world. Part III delineates the EPA’s regulatory response to the 
Massachusetts v. EPA decision and the subsequent applicability of the 
CAA to GHGs. Part IV presents the legal challenges that have arisen in 
the wake of the EPA’s actions. Part V defends the EPA’s actions, drawing 
on the text and legislative history of the CAA, as well as judicial prece-
dent. 
I. Legal Framework 
A. Overview of the Clean Air Act 
 The CAA is a comprehensive federal statute regulating pollutant 
emissions from various sources.14 A forward-looking and precautionary 
statute, the CAA seeks to regulate pollutant emissions in order to re-
duce levels of air pollution to certain health-based standards nation-
wide.15 
 In its central provision, the CAA calls for the Administrator of the 
EPA to identify and list air pollutants that “cause or contribute to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”16 The EPA must then set National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS)17 at a level that provides an “adequate 
margin of safety” that is necessary to protect public health.18 States 
must then attempt to achieve the NAAQS promulgated by the EPA for 
each air pollutant through the adoption of a State Implementation 
Plan, which the EPA may either approve or reject based on certain cri-
teria.19 To date, the EPA has set NAAQS for six different pollutants un-
                                                                                                                      
 
14 Laws & Regulations: Summary of the CAA, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa. 
gov/regulations/laws/caa.html (last updated Aug. 11, 2011). 
15 See Jill Jaffe, Scientific Uncertainty and the Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean 
Air Act, 37 Ecology L.Q. 765, 765–66 (2010). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2006). 
17 Id. § 7409(a)–(b). NAAQS are health-based, ambient air quality standards that de-
note an acceptable amount of certain pollutants in the air for each air pollutant. Id. The 
EPA is authorized to set both primary and secondary NAAQS—the former at a level neces-
sary to protect public health and the latter at a level necessary to protect public welfare. Id. 
The secondary NAAQS are less relevant to the analysis in this Note. 
18 Id. § 7409(a)–(b). 
19 Id. § 7410(a), (c). A State Implementation Plan (SIP) is a regulatory plan, promul-
gated by each state and approved by the EPA, that provides a comprehensive legal frame-
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der the Act.20 To facilitate the maintenance of NAAQS, the CAA also 
contains provisions for review of new and modified sources to ensure 
that these sources employ advanced technology.21 New or modified ma-
jor sources must obtain permits prior to construction and must meet 
certain requirements.22 
 The Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program 
is a subset of the CAA’s preconstruction permitting scheme that applies 
in areas of the country with air quality clean enough to meet the 
NAAQS for each pollutant (attainment areas), or in areas that are un-
classifiable.23 The purpose of the PSD Program is to prevent the dete-
rioration of air quality in these regions of the country that would oth-
erwise not be regulated because they meet the NAAQS.24 The provision 
applies to all new or modified facilities that have the potential to emit 
at least 250 tons per year of any air pollutant.25 
 Finally, Title II of the CAA contains a provision that regulates au-
tomobile emissions.26 Specifically, Title II provides that the EPA shall 
promulgate regulations and “standards applicable to the emission of 
any air pollutant from any class . . . of new motor vehicles . . . which in 
[the EPA Administrator’s] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air 
pollution . . . reasonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.”27 It is this provision that brought the regulation of green-
house gases (GHGs) before the United States Supreme Court.28 
                                                                                                                      
work through which the state intends to meet the requirements of the Act. See id. 
§ 7410(a). If the EPA does not approve a state’s SIP, or if a state refuses to participate, the 
EPA will issue a federal implementation plan on the state’s behalf. Id. § 7410(c). 
20 Patricia Ross McCubbin, EPA’s Endangerment Finding for Greenhouse Gases and the Po-
tential Duty to Adopt National Ambient Air Quality Standards to Address Global Climate Change, 33 
S. Ill. U. L.J. 437, 444 & n.44 (2009). “Those six pollutants are particulate matter, sulfur 
dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, ozone and lead.” Id. 
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(c), 7503 (applicable in “nonattainment” areas), 7470–7479 (ap-
plicable in “attainment” or “unclassifiable” areas). 
22 See id. §§ 7501–7503 (for “nonattainment” preconstruction permitting definitions 
and requirements), 7470–7479 (for “attainment” or “unclassifiable” preconstruction per-
mitting definitions and requirements). 
23 See id. §§ 7470–7479. 
24 See id. § 7470. 
25 Id. §§ 7475, 7479. 
26 See id. § 7521. 
27 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
28 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505. 
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B. The CAA’s Applicability to GHGs: Massachusetts v. EPA and the EPA’s 
Endangerment Finding 
 Until recently, the CAA was thought to apply only to emissions that 
conjure up traditional ideas of pollution—chemicals that are directly 
hazardous to human health.29 Throughout the late 20th century, how-
ever, an awareness emerged that pollution could lead to problems oth-
er than direct effects to human health.30 With a landmark decision by 
the United States Supreme Court in 2007, the traditional framework of 
pollution regulation was about to change.31 
1. Historical Background: The Climate Change Debate 
 At the time Congress passed the CAA in 1970, the science behind 
human-generated global warming was just underway.32 In fact, there 
was very little attention paid to the issue during the debates surround-
ing passage of the Act.33 In the late 1970s, the awareness of global 
warming and its risks gained momentum.34 In response to an Act 
passed by Congress,35 President Carter placed the task of investigating 
the scientific implications of man-induced climate change with the Na-
tional Research Council (NRC).36 The NRC found that carbon dioxide 
generates climate change and that “[a] wait-and-see policy may mean 
waiting until it is too late.”37 
 Later, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published 
a comprehensive report on the issue that echoed the NRC Report link-
ing human-generated GHG emissions to global warming.38 The grow-
ing international recognition of global warming spurred an interna-
tional meeting in Kyoto, Japan in 1997.39 Representatives from various 
nations drafted a protocol setting mandatory targets for GHG emissions 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 
44,354, 44,355 ( July 30, 2008). 
30 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 507–09. 
31 See id. at 528 (holding that the CAA authorizes the regulation of GHGs). 
32 Id. at 507. 
33 Id. at 507 n.8. 
34 Id. at 507. 
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 2902, 2904 (2006). The National Climate Program Act requires the 
President to “establish a national climate program that will assist the Nation and the world 
to understand and respond to natural and man-induced climate processes and their impli-
cations.” Id. 
36 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 507–08. 
37 Id. at 508. 
38 Id. at 508–09. 
39 Id. at 509. 
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reductions in industrialized nations, which the United States refused to 
sign.40 
2. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA: The Evolution of a Statute 
 As the political environment evolved to encompass new discoveries 
regarding climate change, the CAA itself was being interpreted more 
expansively by courts.41 In November 1973, the EPA published final 
regulations concluding that lead in gasoline endangers42 public health 
and thus should be regulated under the CAA.43 Industry groups chal-
lenged the final rule on the ground that there was not sufficient con-
crete evidence to prove that lead additives in gasoline endanger public 
health, and thus the rulemaking was found to be arbitrary and capri-
cious.44 
 Nevertheless in 1979, the D.C. Circuit upheld the rulemaking in 
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, holding that because the CAA is a precautionary and 
preventative statute, it is the EPA’s responsibility to regulate and pre-
vent harm, even if that harm is not certain or is based on incomplete 
evidence.45 
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence diffi-
cult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the 
frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to 
protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert 
administrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof 
of cause and effect.46 
Instead, the CAA and “common sense demand regulatory action to 
prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is 
otherwise inevitable.”47 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. 
41 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that regulation 
under the CAA must be proactive and anticipate possible but uncertain harms). 
42 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 506 n.7 (2007). At the time of the rulemaking, 
section 202(a)(1) of the 1970 CAA required the EPA to determine whether the pollutant 
“endangers” public health or welfare. Id. This language was later amended in 1977 to “may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger.” Id. The implications of this modification are im-
portant to this Note and are discussed further below. 
43 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 10. 
44 Id. at 11. 
45 Id. at 7, 28–29. 
46 Id. at 28. 
47 Id. at 25. 
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 The holding in Ethyl Corp. was later codified in the CAA by the 
drafters of the 1990 Amendments.48 The drafters amended the lan-
guage of section 202(a)(1) from “endangers” to “may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger” to afford the EPA more discretion to protect 
public health and welfare in the face of scientific uncertainty.49 
3. The Commencement of Legal Action in the United States 
 Although the CAA evolved to encompass pollutants not originally 
anticipated by the Act,50 the EPA had not yet attempted to regulate 
GHGs.51 The growing international sentiment that humans were caus-
ing a potentially catastrophic environmental problem, coupled with 
U.S. inaction to prevent such a problem, spurred a group of private 
organizations to file a rulemaking petition with the EPA.52 The petition 
asked that the EPA regulate GHG emission from new motor vehicles 
under section 202 of the CAA.53 In support of their request, the peti-
tioners noted that two successive general counsels recognized the EPA’s 
authority to regulate GHGs under the Act.54 However, a new admini-
stration occupied the White House by the time the EPA responded to 
the petition—after more than 50,000 public comments and another 
scientific report from the NRC.55 
 The EPA, now under the George W. Bush administration,56 denied 
the petition in September 2003.57 The EPA concluded that, upon ex-
amination of the text, history of the statute, and recent court decisions, 
contrary to statements of prior general counsels the CAA did not give 
the EPA authority to regulate global climate change.58 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 506 n.7. 
49 See id. 
50 See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 28–29. 
51 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505. 
52 See id. at 510. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. at 510–11. 
55 Id. at 510–11; see William J. Clinton, White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
about/presidents/williamjclinton (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (the Clinton Administration 
governed in 1999, when the petition was filed); George W. Bush, White House, http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/georgewbush (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (President George 
W. Bush entered the White House in January 2001, and his administration governed when 
the petition was denied in 2003). 
56 See George W. Bush, White House, supra note 55. 
57 Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 
52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
58 Id. at 52,925. 
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GHGs could not be considered air pollutants under the Act.59 The EPA 
gave two reasons why Congress meant for GHGs to be excluded from 
regulation under the CAA: (1) Congress was aware of the problem 
when it passed the 1990 CAA amendments, and yet did not establish 
standards for GHG regulation, and (2) that it had addressed the GHG 
problem through other legislative acts.60 In describing the EPA’s deci-
sion in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court stated,“[i]n essence, EPA con-
cluded that climate change was so important that unless Congress 
spoke with exacting specificity, it could not have meant the Agency to 
address it.”61 Furthermore, the EPA noted that even if it possessed au-
thority to regulate GHGs under the Act, given the uncertainty sur-
rounding GHG science and the President’s allegedly comprehensive 
alternative approach to addressing the problem, the appropriate ap-
proach would not be regulation.62 
 Soon after, private organizations, now joined by intervening states 
and local governments, challenged the EPA’s decision in the D.C. Cir-
cuit.63 Finding that the EPA properly exercised its authority under sec-
tion 202 of the CAA, the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA’s ruling.64 Noting 
that the Act gave the EPA Administrator the ability to use judgment in 
making an endangerment finding, the court concluded that such 
judgment included the consideration of external factors such as scien-
tific uncertainty and policy judgments.65 On June 26, 2006, the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit’s 
ruling.66 
4. Massachusetts v. EPA: The First Spark in a Chain Reaction 
 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the United States Supreme Court issued an 
authoritative judicial statement that GHGs do fall under the CAA’s reg-
ulatory framework.67 In a controversial decision, the Court ruled that 
GHGs are air pollutants under the meaning of section 202 of the CAA, 
forcing the EPA to reconsider its previous decision not to issue an en-
                                                                                                                      
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 52,926–28. 
61 549 U.S. 497, 512 (2007). 
62 See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
52,929–31. 
63 See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
64 Id. at 58. 
65 Id. 
66 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 548 U.S. 903 (U.S. 
June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120). 
67 See 549 U.S. at 528–29. 
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dangerment finding.68 The Court’s reasoning amounted, very simply, 
to a strict interpretation of the statutory text.69 Because the text of sec-
tion 202 requires the Administrator to prescribe standards to regulate 
the emission of any air pollutant that “cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare,” and the Act’s sweepingly broad definition of air pol-
lutant, the Court found that there is no doubt that GHGs are were con-
trolled under the CAA.70 
 Furthermore, although the EPA argued that the Act allows the 
Administrator to use personal judgment in issuing an endangerment 
finding, the Court found that this judgment extends only to a determi-
nation of whether an air pollutant “may reasonably be anticipated to 
endanger public health or welfare.”71 In other words, the CAA, accord-
ing to the Court, provides the EPA with no discretion to consider factors 
external to the statutory text when making the decision to regulate.72 
 Accordingly, the Court gave the EPA three options on how to pro-
ceed: “(1) issue a finding that GHG-related air pollution ‘may reasona-
bly be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,’ (2) issue a 
finding of no endangerment, or (3) provide a ‘reasonable explanation’ 
for why the agency cannot or will not exercise its discretion to make 
such a determination.”73 Noting the mandatory nature of the language 
in the statute, the Court concluded that if the EPA were to issue an en-
dangerment finding under the terms of the Act, it must regulate GHG 
emissions from automobiles.74 
5. The Endangerment Finding 
 In response to the Massachusetts v. EPA decision, after “careful con-
sideration of the full weight of scientific evidence and a thorough re-
view of numerous public comments,” the Administrator of the EPA is-
sued an endangerment finding on December 15, 2009.75 The EPA Ad-
                                                                                                                      
68 See id. An “endangerment finding” is the common term for a finding that an air pol-
lutant may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare under the terms 
of the Act. See id. at 534. 
69 See id. at 528–29. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. at 532–33. 
72 See id. 
73 Allen & Lewis, supra note 4, at 921. 
74 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533. 
75 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Sec-
tion 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
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ministrator found the body of scientific evidence at the time compel-
lingly supported a finding of endangerment.76 
 The EPA defined the relevant air pollutant as an aggregate “mix of 
six long-lived and directly-emitted greenhouse gases,”77 that taken to-
gether endanger human health by changing Earth’s climate.78 Specifi-
cally, the Administrator found that GHGs present a risk via “changes in 
air quality, increases in temperatures, changes in extreme weather 
events, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens, and changes in 
aeroallergens.”79 Furthermore, the EPA found that automobile emis-
sions of this air pollutant contribute to the air pollution that endangers 
human health and welfare.80 Therefore, according to the words of the 
statute, the EPA was now required to regulate GHGs.81 
II. Chain Reaction: The Non-Discretionary Nature of 
Regulation Under the CAA 
 The Court explained in Massachusetts v. EPA that an endangerment 
finding would not result in drastic changes to the current regulatory 
system, but would only result in a slight regulation of new motor vehicle 
emissions standards tempered by a consideration of costs.82 Scholars 
have noted, citing consequences regulating greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs) under the CAA, that the Court’s reassurances seem misin-
formed.83 They forewarn, that “[t]he CAA is a highly interconnected 
statute.”84 As a result, the EPA’s endangerment finding has the poten-
tial to set off a “regulatory chain reaction” under different sections of 
the CAA.85 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id. at 66,497. 
77 Id. The six GHGs are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 66,499. 
81 See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). “The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe 
. . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant . . . which in [the EPA Admin-
istrator’s] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution . . . reasonably . . . antici-
pated to endanger public health or welfare.” Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, in May 2010, 
the EPA took action to regulate GHG emissions from vehicles for model years 2012–2016. 
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, and 600). 
82 See 549 U.S. 497, 531 (2007). 
83 See Allen & Lewis, supra note 4, at 922–23. 
84 Id. at 922. 
85 See id. at 923; Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: 
Does Chevron Set the EPA Free?, 29 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 283, 288 (2010). 
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A. National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
 The CAA requires the EPA to issue National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) for an air pollutant within twelve months of its list-
ing for regulation.86 Furthermore, the EPA must list a pollutant for 
regulation if: (1) the pollutant will “cause or contribute to air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare,”87 (2) the pollutant’s existence in the air “results from numerous 
or diverse mobile or stationary sources,”88 and (3) the EPA intends to 
provide air quality standards under section 108 of the CAA.89 
 The EPA’s endangerment finding manifests that criteria (1) and 
(2) are satisfied.90 First, the very fact of the endangerment finding im-
plies that, in the EPA Administrator’s judgment, GHG emissions from 
mobile sources cause or contribute to air pollution that is reasonably 
anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.91 Satisfying the sec-
ond prong, the EPA notes that GHGs are emitted by far more numerous 
and varied sources than are other pollutants regulated under the Act.92 
 Commentators note, however, that the third criterion appears to 
provide the EPA with discretion regarding whether to issue a NAAQS 
for any air pollutant, even if an endangerment finding has already been 
issued.93 In other words, read literally, the word “plans” seems to imply 
that the EPA Administrator has complete discretion regarding whether 
to list a pollutant, regardless of its dangerousness or ubiquity.94 When 
looking at the structure and legislative history of the CAA, however, a 
scholar contends that this result was not intended.95 For example, Title 
I of the CAA is centered upon a series of deadlines and mandatory EPA 
duties enforceable by citizen suits.96 “If subparagraph C allows EPA to 
                                                                                                                      
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(a). Section 7408(a) requires the EPA to issue quality cri-
teria for each pollutant for which an endangerment finding has been issued. Id. § 7408(a). 
Section 7409(a) requires the EPA to issue NAAQS for each pollutant for which quality 
criteria have been issued. Id. § 7409(a). 
87 Id. § 7408(a)(1)(A). 
88 Id. § 7408(a)(1)(B). 
89 Id. § 7408(a)(1)(C). 
90 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497, 66,543 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
91 Id. at 66,497. 
92 Id. at 66,543. 
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(C); McCubbin, supra note 20, at 451; Richardson, supra 
note 85, at 300–01. 
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(C); McCubbin, supra note 20, at 451; Richardson, supra 
note 85, at 300–01. 
95 See McCubbin, supra note 20, at 450–51. 
96 Id. 
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choose whether to proceed with the air quality criteria for a particular 
pollutant, then the whole series of apparently mandatory obligations 
becomes unhinged.”97 
 In fact, it was not long after the passage of the CAA that the Sec-
ond Circuit argued this same position in their decision in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train in 1976.98 In that case, in which the 
EPA believed that it had discretion not to issue a NAAQS for lead un-
der section 108, the Second Circuit disagreed.99 
The structure of the Clean Air Act as amended in 1970, its 
legislative history, and the judicial gloss placed upon the Act 
leave no room for an interpretation which makes the issuance 
of air quality standards for lead under § 108 discretionary. 
The Congress sought to eliminate, not perpetuate, opportu-
nity for administrative foot-dragging. Once the conditions of 
§§ 108(a)(1)(A) and (B) have been met, the listing of lead 
and the issuance of air quality standards for lead become 
mandatory.100 
Thus, because the GHG endangerment finding satisfied the first and 
second prongs of section 108 of the Act, many legal analysts have ar-
gued that the EPA now has a mandatory obligation to list GHGs as a 
criteria pollutant and promulgate a NAAQS.101 Nevertheless, the EPA 
has not taken any action toward this end, essentially ignoring the Sec-
ond Circuit’s opinion and retaining the discretion—that the court 
seemed to foreclose—not to list GHGs.102 
B. Regulation Under the PSD Preconstruction Permitting Program 
 In addition to arguably requiring the EPA to establish a NAAQS 
for GHGs,103 the endangerment finding and subsequent regulation of 
mobile source emissions also triggers the application of the CAA’s Pre-
vention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Program to GHGs.104 The 
PSD Program requires new major sources and proposed modifications 
to existing major sources of air pollutants to obtain a permit prior to 
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2012] Regulation of Stationary Source Greenhouse Gas Under the CAA 225 
construction.105 For PSD purposes, the CAA defines “major emitting 
facility”106 as (1) a source in a specifically enumerated source category 
that is capable of emitting 100 tons per year (tpy) of any air pollutant 
or (2) any other facility that is capable of emitting 250 tpy of any air 
pollutant.107 
 Historically, there was some debate about the definition of “major 
emitting facility,” and thus to which sources the PSD Program ap-
plied.108 In 1978, after the EPA promulgated regulations implementing 
the PSD Program under the 1977 Amendments to the CAA, the regula-
tions were challenged in court.109 In its interpretation of the applicabil-
ity of the PSD provisions to certain sources of air pollution, the D.C. 
Circuit in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle noted that the PSD Program ap-
plies very broadly.110 The term “any air pollutant,” according to the 
court, meant any pollutant that is otherwise regulated under the Act, 
even those pollutants for which NAAQS have not been established.111 
The court held that the PSD Program was not meant to apply only to a 
limited class of defined pollutants, but to all facilities that had the po-
tential to emit large quantities of any harmful substances that “befoul 
our nation’s air.”112 Thus, citing the broad applicability of the PSD pro-
visions outlined in Alabama Power, scholars have noted that once GHGs 
are regulated under the Title II mobile source program, they also be-
come regulated under the PSD Program.113 
 Unlike the promulgation of a NAAQS for GHGs,114 the Obama 
administration has chosen not to ignore the triggering of PSD applica-
bility, and has issued a rule applying PSD provisions to GHG emitters 
under the CAA.115 This rule, which the EPA refers to as the Tailoring 
Rule, is the focus of this Note.116 
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C. Practical Implications of the Chain Reaction 
 The applicability of various provisions of the CAA to GHGs has the 
potential to affect millions of sources across the United States.117 Spe-
cifically, and most relevant to this Note, the PSD provision of the CAA 
requires preconstruction permits for major stationary sources of any air 
pollutant in excess of 250 tpy.118 Currently, only large industrial factories 
(and some small manufacturers) are subject to the PSD requirements 
because they are the only sources large enough to emit more than 250 
tpy of the currently regulated pollutants.119 Unlike the pollutants cur-
rently subject to regulation under the Act, however, GHGs are emitted 
in large quantities not only by industrial facilities, but also by small 
commercial structures.120 Therefore, if the PSD provision were to be-
come applicable to GHGs under the current text of the Act, approxi-
mately 1.2 million buildings and facilities across the country would be-
come subject to the PSD preconstruction review process and permitting 
requirements (according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).121 
 This potential increase presents significant problems, as the PSD 
preconstruction review process is expensive.122 First, firms must comply 
with PSD requirements by implementing best available control tech-
nology to reduce emissions according to industry best practices.123 Fur-
thermore, each source must undergo a lengthy permitting process with 
the local agency to ensure its compliance with the PSD require-
ments.124 EPA has estimated that each permit costs the regulated 
source an average of over $125,000 and requires the EPA (or the state 
environmental agency) to invest over 300 hours and $20,000.125 
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III. The Regulatory Response: The Chain Reaction Generates 
Absurd Results 
A. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
 In the first official EPA response to the Massachusetts v. EPA deci-
sion, the EPA, under the outgoing George W. Bush administration, is-
sued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR), which noted 
the far-reaching implications of the Court’s ruling and solicited com-
ments regarding the prospect of regulating greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
under the CAA.126 The EPA expressly noted the likelihood that the ap-
plicability of the Act to mobile sources would also trigger applicability 
of other CAA provisions to small stationary sources.127 Specifically, the 
EPA noted in the ANPR the high likelihood that, if the EPA were to is-
sue an endangerment finding, it would immediately trigger PSD re-
quirements for sources with the potential to emit more than 250 tons 
per year (tpy) of GHGs.128 Noting the harmful effects that regulating 
GHGs under these provisions would have on the American economy, 
the EPA in 2008 aligned itself emphatically against the idea.129 
[T]he Clean Air Act, an outdated law originally enacted to 
control regional pollutants that cause direct health effects, is 
ill-suited for the task of regulating global greenhouse gases. 
Based on the analysis to date, pursuing this course of action 
would inevitably result in a very complicated, time-consuming 
and, likely, convoluted set of regulations.130 
B. The Tailoring Rule and the Absurd Results Canon 
1. The Tailoring Rule 
 The Obama administration did not take the concerns raised by the 
Bush administration in the ANPR lightly.131 In fact, the Obama admini-
stration echoed these concerns even more strongly, noting that “[i]f 
PSD . . . requirements apply at the applicability levels provided under 
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the CAA, State permitting authorities would be paralyzed by permit ap-
plications in numbers that are orders of magnitude greater than their cur-
rent administrative resources could accommodate.”132 The EPA noted, 
as it did under its predecessor regime, that the number of sources regu-
lated under the PSD Program would be astronomically high and over-
whelm administrative resources.133 Specifically, the EPA estimated that 
per-year PSD permit applications would increase from 280 to approxi-
mately 41,000, a 140-fold increase.134 
 Rather than denounce the CAA as an outdated and improper 
mode of regulating GHGs,135 however, on October 27, 2009, the EPA 
published a proposed rule that would alter and delay the applicability 
of the PSD Program for certain GHG emitters.136 To address the diffi-
culties noted above, the proposed tailoring rule advocated a phasing 
approach to the application of the PSD Program to GHGs.137 
 During Step I, beginning on January 2, 2011, no sources will be 
subject to regulation—and thus, subject to PSD permitting—based 
solely on GHG emissions.138 Instead, only sources that already require 
PSD permits based on their potential to emit non-GHG pollutants—so 
called “anyway sources”139—must meet PSD permitting for GHGs.140 
Furthermore, Step I only applies if the newly constructed facility will 
have the potential to emit at least 75,000 tpy of GHGs (or a modified 
facility, where the modification results in at least a 75,000 tpy emissions 
increase), measured in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e).141 
 The second step, which begins on July 1, 2011, accounts for GHG 
emissions standing alone when determining whether a source must ap-
ply for a PSD permit.142 In addition, after this date, a new source will be 
subject to PSD permitting requirements if it has the potential to emit 
100,000 tpy of CO2e (or modification projects that increase potential 
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GHG emissions by 75,000 tpy CO2e for an existing 100,000 tpy CO2e-
emitting source).143 This is a significant relaxation of the normal statu-
tory threshold of 250 tpy of any air pollutant.144 
 Finally, the EPA noted in the Tailoring Rule that it would issue a 
supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking sometime in 2011 to ad-
dress the potential applicability of the PSD provisions to smaller 
sources.145 The EPA will complete this rulemaking by July 2012 and it 
will go into effect in July 2013.146 The Agency made clear, however, that 
PSD regulations would not apply to sources with the potential to emit 
less than 50,000 tpy of CO2e until at least April 2016.147 
 According to the EPA, this new, phased approach will not only sig-
nificantly alleviate the financial burdens of the new rule (both on EPA 
and on regulated sources), but also will not comprise the overall goal of 
reducing GHG emissions.148 That is, even after the second step, only 
about 550 new sources—as opposed to tens of thousands149—will come 
under regulation,150 while eighty-six percent of GHG emissions that 
would be reduced under a facial application will still be reduced under 
a tailored application of the statute.151 
2. Absurd Results: The Legal Basis for Rule 
 The key question that arises from the Tailoring Rule is, given the 
statutory language that defines a major stationary source as a factory 
with the potential to emit 250 tpy of any air pollutant subject to regula-
tion under CAA,152 from where does the EPA derive the authority to re-
write this definition for the purpose of regulating GHGs? The answer, 
according to the EPA, comes from both agency discretion established in 
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the wake of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.153 
as well as the absurd results doctrine.154 
a. Chevron: Agency Discretion in the Face of Legislative Silence 
 The United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron governs the 
level of review that courts exercise over agency legislative interpreta-
tion.155 The case lays out a two-part test for when agency interpretations 
are valid under the enabling legislation: (1) if Congress’s intent is clear, 
the agency (and the court when reviewing the agency’s decision) must 
give effect to that unambiguous intent, or (2) if Congress has not ad-
dressed the issue, however, or if its intent is ambiguous, then the agency 
may employ a permissible interpretation of the statute.156 
 The Court further noted that Congress may delegate authority on 
a particular issue to an agency in implicit rather than explicit terms, 
and, in such cases, “a court may not substitute its own construction of a 
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the admin-
istrator of an agency.”157 Finally, the Court observed a long judicial his-
tory of according considerable weight and deference to agency inter-
pretations of the statutes it has been trusted to administer.158 
b. Absurd Results 
 By applying Chevron deference to the Tailoring Rule, the EPA in-
vokes the absurd results doctrine to provide a legal justification for its 
decision to override the text of the statute and tailor the PSD Program 
to encompass GHGs.159 According to the clear text of the Act, the PSD 
provisions are applicable to any new or modified major source that 
emits more than 250 tpy of any air pollutant.160 Thus, under a tradi-
tional Chevron analysis, Congress did not afford discretion in its inter-
pretation of the PSD applicability threshold because the statute was un-
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ambiguous.161 As commentators have noted, “there is nothing ambigu-
ous about the 250 tpy standard already established under the Clean Air 
Act.”162 So how does the absurd results doctrine inject ambiguity into 
clear legislative text? 
 The absurd results doctrine, according to the EPA, stands for the 
proposition that “where a literal reading of a statutory term would lead 
to absurd results, the term simply has no meaning . . . and is the proper 
subject of construction by EPA and the courts.”163 In other words, if 
applying the literal meaning of legislation would produce a result that 
is senseless and is inconsistent with congressional intent, then “the lit-
eral meaning . . . should not be considered.”164 In such a case, the 
agency should proceed under the second prong of the Chevron analy-
sis—as if Congress had not addressed the issue or had done so ambigu-
ously— applying a reasonable construction of the Act to the issue at 
and
tpy—provided it acts reasonably in light of congressional in-
tent.168 
portant to this Note’s analysis. First, the movants argued that the en-
                                                                                                                     
h .165 
 The EPA feels that the CAA’s literal application to GHGs would be 
absurd, given the consequences.166 Specifically, the EPA posits that the 
agency structure would be so backlogged that it would be impossible to 
implement an effective permitting program.167 Thus, the EPA argues 
that it is free under Chevron to implement its own interpretation of the 
Act—namely, to change the PSD applicability threshold from 250 tpy to 
100,000 
IV. Legal Challenges to EPA Action 
 On September 15, 2010, after the EPA published its final Tailoring 
Rule, a group of industry representatives (the movants)—led by the 
Coalition for Responsible Regulation—filed a motion seeking to stay 
the implementation of the EPA rules.169 The movants, in a brief in sup-
port of their motion to stay, made two primary arguments that are im-
 
161 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
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168 See id. at 31,516–17. 
169 See generally Mot. for Stay, Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, No. 09-1322 and 
consolidated cases (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2010) (motion for stay denied Dec. 10, 2010). 
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dangerment finding is not legally valid under the CAA.170 Second, the 
movants argued that the Tailoring Rule is without legal authority and is 
“[an] illegal solution[] to a legal problem of EPA’s own creation.”171 
A. Challenge to the Endangerment Finding 
 First, the movants argued that the EPA illegally sub-delegated their 
authority to outside agencies to conduct the scientific analysis under-
pinning the endangerment finding.172 Specifically, they contended that 
section 202(a) of the CAA requires the EPA Administrator to issue an 
endangerment finding when, in the Administrator’s judgment, the pol-
lutants may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare.173 In issuing the endangerment finding, however, the EPA primar-
ily relied on outside studies by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) to form the basis of its scientific analysis.174 Thus, ac-
cording to the movants in this case, the EPA Administrator did not ex-
ercise the Administrator’s own judgment, and thus the EPA’s issuance 
of the endangerment finding was outside the grant of authority in the 
statute.175 
B. Challenge to the Tailoring Rule 
 The movants also challenged the Tailoring Rule, contending that 
the EPA’s invocation of the absurd results doctrine is an arbitrary and 
capricious answer to a problem it created through an initial misreading 
of the CAA.176 Specifically, the movants argued that the PSD provisions 
in the CAA were meant only to apply to the criteria pollutants already 
defined in 1977, the time of passage, and not to future criteria pollut-
ants or any other emissions.177 They asserted that the correct interpre-
tation of the language “each pollutant subject to regulation under this 
chapter” contained in the Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
(PSD) provisions is a present-tense interpretation applicable only to 
pollutants contemplated by the 1977 Act.178 Thus, under their reading 
of the statute, regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from vehicle 
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emissions would not trigger the applicability of the PSD provisions at 
all.179 Such a reading would render the invocation of the absurd results 
doctrine unnecessary.180 
 In other words, the movants argued that the EPA created the ab-
surd results themselves by refusing to follow the unambiguous reading 
of the statute.181 The movants further argued that by applying the PSD 
provisions to GHGs—an act that they were without authority to do—the 
EPA unlawfully created the absurd result that, as the EPA claimed, gave 
it authority to ignore the plain text of the Act.182 “EPA cannot create its 
own administrative necessity by ignoring one provision of the Act, and 
then solve that manufactured necessity by ignoring another.”183 
V. Absurd Results? Not So Absurd After All 
 The movants’ arguments in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. 
EPA, presents strong challenges to the legal authority underlying EPA’s 
Tailoring Rule.184 The Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, however, 
set in motion a mandatory chain of greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation 
under the CAA, which, given the congressional intent behind the Act 
and the EPA’s role in implementing it, make the EPA’s actions both le-
gally justified and mandatory.185 
A. The Endangerment Finding and Applicability of the PSD Provisions Were 
Mandated by Massachusetts v. EPA and Legislative Intent 
 First, the movants argued that the EPA was not legally authorized 
to issue an endangerment finding.186 This argument, however, is fore-
closed by the legislative history of the Act, by the Act’s broad language, 
and by long-standing precedent, including Massachusetts v. EPA.187 
1. The Evolution of a Flexible Statute 
 The precedent and legislative history surrounding the CAA urges 
a forward-looking, precautionary, and flexible approach to its applica-
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tion.188 First, in Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit noted that the 
language of CAA and related judicial interpretations manifests its pre-
cautionary nature and provides the EPA with discretion—and, in fact, a 
mandate—to regulate to “precede, and, optimally, prevent, the per-
ceived threat.”189 The court further noted that in the case of precau-
tionary statutes such as the CAA, and where scientific evidence is un-
certain and cutting-edge, the EPA need not provide “rigorous step-by-
step proof of cause and effect,” but instead must only make a reason-
able judgment based on the available science that the pollutant will en-
danger public health or welfare.190 
 The legislative history of the CAA confirms the D.C. Circuit’s analy-
sis.191 In 1977, Congress amended the CAA to codify the court’s holding 
in Ethyl.192 Specifically, Congress amended endangerment language in 
the Act, changing “which endangers” to “which may reasonably be an-
ticipated to endanger” to solidify the EPA’s broad discretion when regu-
lating under such a forward-looking, precautionary statute.193 
2. The Mandate of Massachusetts v. EPA 
 The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA clearly stated that the EPA must 
take action toward regulating GHGs under the CAA or provide a statu-
tory justification for not doing so.194 Specifically, the Court mandated 
that the EPA take one of three courses of action: (1) issue an endan-
germent finding; (2) “issue a finding of no endangerment;” or (3) pro-
vide a “reasonable explanation” for its decision not to act.195 Although 
the EPA ultimately chose the first option, based on the Court’s opinion 
and the language of the Act, it was more a requirement than choice. 
 First, the language of the statute, when considered in light of judi-
cial precedent, ensures that option two is not viable.196 As is clear from 
case law, the EPA has broad authority and, in fact, a mandate to regu-
late preventatively in the face of uncertain science.197 Also, the lan-
guage of the Act clearly establishes that weather and climate effects are 
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included in the possible harms to public welfare that may be consid-
ered in an endangerment finding.198 
 Second, the Supreme Court’s explanation of the extent of the 
EPA’s judgment in whether or not to act effectively removes the viability 
of the third option.199 The Court noted that “the use of the word 
‘judgment’ is not a roving license to ignore the statutory text.”200 In-
stead, the only discretion that the EPA possesses is whether GHG emis-
sions “cause[], or contribute[] to, air pollution which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”201 
 Furthermore, the Court makes clear that declining to regulate for 
external reasons, such as political circumstances or scientific uncer-
tainty, are not valid uses of the EPA’s discretion.202 The only question, 
the Court notes, is “whether sufficient information exists to make an 
endangerment finding.”203 Given the circumstances surrounding the 
case, this question could only be answered in the affirmative.204 Thus, 
the EPA may not simply decline to consider the issue of climate change 
under the Act.205 
3. The Appropriateness of the Endangerment Finding 
 Finally, contrary to the movants’ arguments in Coalition for Respon-
sible Regulation v. EPA, the EPA acted appropriately in relying on IPCC 
research regarding climate change and did not impermissibly sub-
delegate its authority to the IPCC.206 Although an agency may not sim-
ply rubber stamp the research and reports of an external entity, it may 
utilize these reports in forming its own opinion.207 
 The agency did not blindly approve the scientific articles on which 
it based the endangerment finding.208 Instead, it conducted an in-
depth analysis of the IPCC findings, considering the foundation, con-
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sensus, and trends of the scientific information, and reexamined these 
findings in light of public comment.209 
 Furthermore, as the D.C. Circuit noted in Ethyl, the EPA has a duty 
to regulate in a preventative manner under the CAA when faced with 
cutting-edge issues and uncertain science.210 Therefore, even if the EPA 
itself could not find conclusive evidence of human-generated climate 
change, it still retained the responsibility to regulate in a reasonable 
manner to prevent the possibility of harm.211 Furthermore, as the EPA 
noted in the endangerment finding, the science was far from uncer-
tain—rather, the evidence that GHGs endangered human health and 
welfare was compelling.212 
B. The Tailoring Rule Is a Permissible Interpretation of the CAA and a 
Permissible Application of the Absurd Results Doctrine 
 Opponents of the Tailoring Rule claim that it is without authority 
under the Act and could have been avoided by a different construction 
of the statute.213 The Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, however, 
and the regulatory cascade that followed made clear that there was no 
alternative construction.214 Furthermore, judicial deference to agency 
interpretation under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. provides strong legal support for the Tailoring Rule.215 
1. PSD Applicability to GHGs Was Mandatory 
 The movants argued that the text of the Act was meant to apply 
only to pollutants subject to regulation at the time the PSD provisions 
were passed in 1977.216 The D.C. Circuit in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 
however, held that the terms of the PSD provisions apply “extremely 
broadly” to sources that emit more than a certain threshold of “any air 
pollutant.”217 In fact, the court found that the provisions apply to major 
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emitting facilities for each pollutant that is regulated under any section 
of the CAA.218 
 Indeed, since the decision in Alabama Power, the EPA’s regulations 
have applied the provisions of the Act quite broadly—to any pollutant 
properly subject to regulation.219 The EPA further defines “subject to 
regulation” as “subject to . . . a provision in the Clean Air Act . . . that 
requires actual control of the quantity of emissions of that pollutant.”220 
In other words, the regulations promulgated under the PSD provisions, 
reflecting judicial precedent, have made clear that the phrase “any air 
pollutant” broadly encompass any pollutant that is subject to actual 
control under any provision of the CAA.221 This is clearly not limited to 
criteria pollutants or pollutants that were subject to regulation at the 
time of the 1977 enactment.222 
 Therefore, as soon as the EPA passed rules governing the emission 
of GHGs for vehicle tailpipe emissions under section 202(a), GHGs be-
came subject to actual control for the purposes of the PSD provision.223 
At that time, according to the clear regulatory language and long-
standing practice, GHGs were also covered under the PSD provision of 
the CAA.224 Thus, the movants’ contention that the EPA’s invocation of 
the absurd results doctrine was based on a misreading of the PSD provi-
sions of the Act was, itself, based on a misreading of the Act.225 Movants 
argue: 
[i]t makes no sense to conclude that a pollutant regulated for 
one purpose (tailpipe standards), from one category of sources 
(cars), under one title of the statute (Title II), based on one set 
of findings (under Section 202(a)), automatically must be reg-
ulated for an entirely different purpose (permitting programs), 
under a totally different regulatory scheme (Titles I and V), 
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when emitted from a wholly separate category of sources (sta-
tionary).226 
The very opposite is true.227 The movants’ argument that the Tailoring 
Rule could have been avoided by a different construction of the Act is 
flawed because there was no other possible construction of the CAA— 
the applicability of the PSD provisions to GHGs was mandatory.228 
2. The Absurd Results Doctrine Is Consistent with Chevron and Its 
Invocation Is Entitled to Deference 
 In their brief, the movants claimed that the EPA’s invocation of the 
absurd results doctrine was outside of its authority because the language 
of the statute is clear.229 According to this line of reasoning, the movants 
argued, the court should uphold the unambiguous nature of the stat-
ute.230 Some legal commentators have echoed this argument, noting 
that the EPA possesses discretion in interpreting the statute only when 
the text of the statute does not address an issue or does so ambigu-
ously.231 “[T]here is nothing ambiguous,” these scholars argue, “about 
the 250 tpy standard already established under the Clean Air Act.”232 
 A closer reading of Chevron, however, manifests the flaw in this log-
ic.233 Chevron stood for the proposition that agencies enjoy wide discre-
tion when the congressional intent is not clear from the statutory 
text.234 Thus, simply because the text of the legislation is clear on its 
face, it does not necessarily follow that congressional intent is clear 
when applying that text to a problem that Congress could never have 
anticipated.235 To understand congressional intent, one must look past 
the text of the statute and to its objectives and other policy considera-
tions.”236 
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 This is precisely what motivated EPA’s drafting of the Tailoring 
Rule.237 Rather than focus on the clear words of the statute—the 250 
tpy threshold for PSD applicability—the EPA realized that these words 
would not represent congressional intent when applied to GHGs.238 
The PSD Program was not meant to apply to small sources of air pollut-
ants, but instead, only to the truly large emitters that presented the po-
tential to generate serious harm to the nation’s pristine air quality re-
gions.239 Thus, an approach that exempted smaller sources, but still 
applied the program to larger sources was reasonable—and arguably 
necessary—to uphold congressional intent.240 
3. Absurd but Necessary: The EPA’s Actions Were the Only Legally 
Permissible Means to Uphold Congressional Intent 
 Not only did Chevron provide a legal justification for the EPA’s ac-
tion, but the context surrounding the decision made clear that invoca-
tion of the Chevron doctrine was the only legally justifiable option.241 
On the one hand, the EPA could not ignore the Court’s clear instruc-
tion to act, the compelling evidence that GHGs endanger human 
health and welfare, and the regulatory cascade that such a finding gen-
erated.242 On the other hand, the EPA could not apply the clear lan-
guage of the PSD provision to GHGs because such action would over-
ride congressional intent.243 
                                                                                                                     
 Clear precedent interpreting the CAA, its legislative history, and 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA all reinforce the 
conclusion that the CAA is a flexible, precautionary statute and the 
EPA’s mandate was to regulate in a preventative manner so as to antici-
pate future harms.244 Furthermore, the Court stated that the fact that 
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Congress did not contemplate PSD applicability to GHGs does not bear 
at all upon whether it was intended to address them.245 
While the Congresses that drafted § 202(a)(1) might not have 
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead 
to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory 
flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments 
would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad lan-
guage of § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the 
flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.246 
 Thus, the EPA faced three important considerations with respect 
to the CAA’s application to GHGs: (1) the regulation of motor vehicle 
emissions mandated PSD applicability to GHGs;247 (2) Congress clearly 
did not intend the PSD Program to be applicable to small sources, such 
as the ones that would emit 250 tpy of GHGs;248 and (3) Congress clear-
ly did intend for the EPA to have discretion to apply the CAA to novel 
circumstances and regulate preventatively to anticipate future harms.249 
In the face of these three truths, the EPA’s only legally viable choice was 
to tailor the PSD threshold—applying the PSD Program to GHGs, as 
was legally mandated, while exempting smaller sources that Congress 
clearly did not intend to include.250 
 When viewed from this angle, criticism of the EPA’s action is 
turned on its head. Assertions that “Congress did not intend to apply 
PSD . . . to small entities, did not intend for those programs to crash 
under their own weight, and did not intend for PSD to stifle economic 
growth” actually supports the EPA’s tailoring of the PSD applicability 
thresholds.251 It is precisely because Congress did not intend the PSD 
provisions to apply to small entities that congressional intent with re-
spect to GHGs is unclear.252 Thus, under Chevron, the EPA is well within 
its legal authority to employ an interpretation that is reasonable.253 
Moreover, the EPA must do so because the alternative would apply the 
PSD provisions of the CAA to millions of small sources, which would 
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paralyze businesses and permitting authorities and clearly undermine 
the intent of Congress.254 
Conclusion 
 The landmark Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA 
drastically changed the way the CAA dealt with GHGs.255 The Court 
itself, however, could never have anticipated or intended the regulatory 
consequences that its ruling generated.256 The Court’s holding man-
dated the EPA’s endangerment finding, which in turn mandated the 
promulgation of a rule regulating GHG emissions from vehicles, which 
in turn sparked the applicability of the CAA’s PSD Program to station-
ary source GHG emitters.257 
 The EPA faced a perilous choice. On the one hand, it could em-
ploy a literal application of the PSD Program—requiring any new 
source with the potential to emit more than 250 tpy of GHGs to apply 
for a PSD permit before construction—paralyzing permitting authori-
ties and potentially destroying the U.S. economy.258 On the other hand, 
the EPA could choose not to regulate GHGs under the PSD provision 
of the Act.259 Both decisions, if implemented, would violate the con-
gressional intent underlying the CAA.260 
 Thus, the EPA chose neither.261 Instead, it tailored the PSD appli-
cability threshold from 250 tpy to 100,000 tpy, drastically rewriting the 
provision to specially account for GHGs.262 While at first glance this 
appears to be an abuse of agency discretion, on closer examination, the 
EPA’s action seems consistent with the principles enumerated in Chev-
ron.263 Furthermore, it seems to be a well-reasoned decision, which fur-
thers the EPA’s long-established preventative role in implementing the 
CAA.264 
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